Law and Macro: What Took So Long? by Listokin, Yair




















      
  
    
  
 





Why has the development of law and macroeconomics lagged so far behind
law and microeconomics?1 In this Article, I consider three hypotheses: 
1. Microeconomics fits better with law and legal reasoning than 
macroeconomics.
2. The Great Moderation of 1980–2007, in which western economies 
mostly avoided the twin perils of high unemployment and high 
inflation, lowered the stakes of macroeconomics relative to 
microeconomics, which encouraged the spread of law and 
microeconomics. The failure of price controls to thwart the high
inflation rates of the 1970s, by contrast, discouraged the development 
of law and macroeconomics.
3. Law and economics’ intellectual origins at the University of Chicago,
a place of libertarian leanings and hostility to Keynesian 
macroeconomics, encouraged the development of law and 
microeconomics rather than macroeconomics.
I mostly reject the first hypothesis. Hypotheses two and three, by contrast,
prove more compelling. 
There are some areas of law, such as contract law, that are seemingly well-
tailored to microeconomic analyses of incentives without focus on economy-wide
general equilibrium effects. However, there are many other areas of law and 
regulation inextricably intertwined with macroeconomics, contradicting
hypothesis one. The key constitutional question of the early U.S. republic—the
establishment of a national bank—was fundamentally a question of 
macroeconomics. Today, it is (or should be) impossible to analyze such
fundamental areas of law as financial regulation, central banking, bankruptcy
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1. I am not the first to ask this question. See generally Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop 
Recessions? Speculations on Law and Macroeconomics, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1215 (1993). Kelman mostly 
concluded that lawyers could not stop recessions. See id. at 1285–86. I will refer to Kelman’s speculations
throughout this Article. 
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law, tax law, the law of government benefits, intellectual property, and 
international economic law without considering macroeconomics. And even
contract law has had crucial (if rare) moments of interaction with
macroeconomics, such as when Congress amended most U.S. credit contracts in
the Great Depression with an eye towards stimulating the economy.2 
The macroeconomic history of the period 1970–2007, law and economics’ era 
of heady growth, offers a more plausible explanation for the predominance of 
law and microeconomics, supporting hypothesis two. During the 1970s, law was 
used for macroeconomic purposes. In fact, the primary initial policy response to
the “Great Inflation” of the 1970s was the introduction of wage and price controls 
under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.3 Price controls failed, tarnishing 
the use of law for macroeconomic purposes.4 
After the conquest of the Great Inflation via a prolonged period of monetary 
policy tightness and unemployment, western economies enjoyed the Great
Moderation, with relatively mild recessions and stable, low inflation. In 2003— 
the heart of the Great Moderation—the American Economic Association’s
president, Robert Lucas, asserted that macroeconomics’ “central problem of
depression prevention has been solved, for all practical purposes, and has in fact 
been solved for many decades.”5 If macroeconomics was a solved problem for 
economists in developed nations, then there was little if any need for lawyers in 
wealthy countries to consider the effects of law on the business cycle, especially 
given the checkered experience of law and macroeconomics during the 1970s. In 
other words: let the economists handle it. This position was no longer tenable 
after the Great Recession, explaining the rising subfield of law and
macroeconomics.
The importance of intellectual fashion also played an important role in the 
underdevelopment of law and macroeconomics (hypothesis 3).  From the 1960s
to the 1980s, law and economics was most closely associated with the University 
of Chicago (Chicago), home of seminal law and economics scholars like Ronald
Coase, Richard Posner, Gary Becker, and Aaron Director, as well as the first two
journals in the field. Association with Chicago practically guaranteed that law 
and economics would avoid macroeconomics. At the time, Chicago’s leading 
macroeconomists first rejected Keynesian business cycle management in favor of 
2. See generally SEBASTIAN EDWARDS, AMERICAN DEFAULT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF FDR,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE OVER GOLD (2018) (describing Congress’s abrogation of 
standard terms in debt contracts giving the creditor the option of demanding repayment in gold rather 
than currency). 
3. See Gene Healy, Remembering Nixon’s Wage and Price Controls, WASH. EXAM’R (Aug. 15, 
2011), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/remembering-nixons-wage-and-price-controls [https:// 
perma.cc/Z355-6UW6]. 
4. Id. 
5. Robert E. Lucas, President, Am. Econ. Assoc., Macroeconomic Priorities, Presidential Address
at the One-Hundred Fifteenth Meeting of the American Economic Association (Jan. 4, 2003), in 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 1 (2003). 
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exclusive reliance on monetary policy6 and then rejected the argument that high 
unemployment during recessions was a problematic phenomenon.7 Neither
school of macroeconomics leaves much, if any, room for law and regulation to 
affect macroeconomic policy productively. As a result, law and economics as
produced at Chicago was naturally dominated by microeconomics.
Law and economics’ early libertarian and deregulatory associations also
played a role in the relative absence of law and macroeconomics. 
Microeconomics—before the development of behavioral economics—assumes 
individual rationality. Under a microeconomic lens, intrusive legal interventions 
tend to be disfavored. Only the presence of externalities justifies legal
intervention, and many externalities can be internalized without law via Coasean 
bargaining.8 Law and microeconomics therefore offered an attractive framework
for scholars with a libertarian and deregulatory bent—and for the philanthropists 
interested in funding a research program producing laissez-faire policy
recommendations. 
Keynesian macroeconomics, by contrast, begins with a market failure—the
presence of excess unemployment due to a lack of aggregate demand in the 
economy. Mitigating this market failure requires government intervention, in the
form of state control over the currency, fiscal policy, or some other mechanism.
Evaluating law from a macroeconomic perspective is therefore just as likely to
favor government intervention as deregulation, making it less attractive than law 
and microeconomics to the early funders who helped popularize the field and
spread its teachings. 
History and ideology therefore worked in tandem to delay the development 
of law and macroeconomics within law and economics generally. The prolonged 
Great Recession that followed the Financial Crisis of 2008, however, indicates 
the need for a shift in direction.9 The Great Recession showed emphatically that
the problem of recession prevention has not been solved. We should therefore 
not be surprised if legal scholars and economists explore law and regulation as a 
tool for mitigating the worst recessions and preventing the asset price bubbles 
that often precede these recessions. Indeed, I predict that macroeconomic 
performance over the next generation will play the most important role in 
determining the future of law and macroeconomics. If many countries experience 
anemic growth rates and low interest rates akin to Japan’s lost decade(s),
heightening the need for new tools of macroeconomic management and further 
6. The theory of “monetarism” was advanced most prominently by Milton Friedman. See generally
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1867–1960 (1963). 
7. This argument is known as the “real business cycle” theory and is associated with Robert Lucas,
among others. See infra note 59. 
8. For an introduction to the Coasean approach to mitigation of externalities, see generally Steven
G. Medema & Richard O. Zerbe Jr., The Coase Theorem, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 
2000, at 836–92. 
9. Macroeconomics is undeniably fond of the adjective “great.” The last century has witnessed the 
“Great Depression,” “Great Inflation,” “Great Moderation,” and “Great Recession.”
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undermining the argument that the economy is capable of self-regulation, then
law and macroeconomics will—and should—flourish. But this flourishing will 
require law and economics to embrace a methodological diversity that has been
missing heretofore. 
II
WHAT IS LAW AND MACROECONOMICS? 
To ask why law and macroeconomics is relatively undeveloped, we first need 
to define what it might be. Macroeconomics is the study of how the aggregate 
economy behaves, examining phenomena like inflation, growth, unemployment, 
money, and interest rates. While microeconomics seeks to understand how one 
market behaves, macroeconomics focuses on the links between markets. At 
times, the links between markets create phenomena that could not exist in a 
single market. For example, a widespread desire to hold on to money or a
reduction in the supply of money may push other markets, such as the labor 
market, out of equilibrium for an extended period. 
Macroeconomics may be further categorized as either short-run or long-run
macroeconomics. Short-run macroeconomics studies the prevention and 
mitigation of recessions. It is primarily concerned with preventing the periodic 
shortages of spending (“aggregate demand”) that cause excess unemployment. 
Long-run macroeconomics, by contrast, studies persistent differences in growth
and output levels. It is primarily concerned with increasing the economy’s ability 
to produce at full employment (“aggregate supply”), which is determined by 
forces such as technological change and capital formation. 
Law and macroeconomics studies how law affects these aggregate variables 
of interest, and how fluctuations in these aggregate variables affect law.10 It offers 
a different perspective from conventional law and microeconomics. In
microeconomics, a law that improves the functioning of an individual market is 
efficient and therefore desirable. In macroeconomics, however, the law’s 
generalized effects must be considered. A law that improves the functioning of 
one market may have negative spillover effects on other markets and on the 
overall economy by impacting aggregate demand or aggregate supply.11 As a
result, macroeconomic perspectives should often produce different policy 
recommendations than conventional law and economics. For example, a
10. For more extensive discussions of law and macroeconomics, see generally YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW
AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS (2019); Yair Listokin & Daniel Murphy, 
Macroeconomics and the Law, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 1 (2019). 
11. See, e.g., Gauti B. Eggertsson, Was the New Deal Contractionary?, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 524, 
549–50 (2012) (showing that the formation of cartels, which inefficiently reduce output in a single market, 
can raise inflationary expectations and therefore increase aggregate demand and thus overall output); 
see also Robert Cooter & Aaron Edlin, Law and Growth Economics: A Framework for Research
(Berkeley Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper Series, 2011),  https://escholarship.org/uc/item/ 
50t4d0kt [https://perma.cc/Q8QR-GTSY] (demonstrating how intellectual property creates 
microeconomic distortions for the purpose of enhancing innovation and increasing long run aggregate 
supply). 
BOOK PROOF - LISTOKIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2020 10:39 PM       





















   
      
 
 
    
  
 
   
 
No. 1 2020] LAW & MACRO: WHAT TOOK SO LONG? 145 
microeconomically inefficient mandate to install pollution scrubbers on power 
plants may be macroeconomically justified during a recession because the
mandate increases spending and lowers wasteful unemployment. However, this 
macroeconomic perspective has rarely been explored by law and economics. 
III
IS MACROECONOMICS ILL-SUITED TO LAW? 
In 1993, Mark Kelman asserted that “macroeconomists have not traditionally 
addressed the types of institutional-design issues that concern lawyers.”12 If it 
were true that there is relatively little nexus between law and the macroeconomy,
we should not be surprised at the underdevelopment of law and macroeconomics.
This assertion is flawed. One of macroeconomists’ principle concerns is the 
money supply, which is critically determined in part by precisely the “types of 
institutional-design issues that concern lawyers.” Central banks exist to help
guarantee the stability of the money supply: their powers and limitations are
fundamentally legal. Examples abound. The status of the first National Bank of 
the United States was the subject of intense constitutional dispute.13 The
international monetary policy regime established by the Bretton Woods system
in the wake of World War II entailed elaborate institutional designs involving
many lawyers and administrators.14 During the Financial Crisis of 2008, one of
the most important decisions was the non-bailout of Lehman Brothers by the 
Federal Reserve, attributed to an absence of legal authority from the detailed
Federal Reserve Act.15 And a group of German plaintiffs challenged the
European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) solution to the European crisis as exceeding
the ECB’s legal authority.16 
The establishment and maintenance of the money supply—a core
macroeconomic issue—is a subject deeply enmeshed in law. Lawyers and 
macroeconomists share this common interest. 
The connections between law and macroeconomics do not end with money. 
As Steven Ramirez has demonstrated, nearly every administrative agency (for 
example, the Securities Exchange Commission, National Labor Relations Board, 
and National Recovery Administration) established during the New Deal began 
12. Kelman, supra note 1, at 1216. 
13. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789– 
1915, at 143–45 (2009) (discussing the intense debate between Federalists and Republicans in 1791 over 
the constitutionality of a law authorizing the Bank of the United States). 
14. See generally John W. Pehle, The Bretton Woods Institutions, 55 YALE L.J. 1127 (1946) 
(describing the institutional design and legal relevance of the newly developed International Monetary
Fund and World Bank). 
15. See TIMOTHY GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 83, 186 (2014) 
(explaining that the Fed “didn’t believe [it] had the legal authority to guarantee Lehman’s trading
liabilities, even using [its] ‘unusual and exigent’ powers under 13(3)”). 
16. See Mehreen Khan, German High Court Rejects Case Against ECB Crisis Tool, FIN. TIMES
(June 21, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/ac3a89c2-f382-388f-b4e6-d1b657361db8 [https://perma.cc/ 
4J82-VN9Z] (describing the constitutional controversy over the ECB’s programs).
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with macroeconomic motives.17 During the Great Depression, the institutional 
design questions considered by lawyers were an integral part of macroeconomic 
policy. Nor was law and macroeconomics merely a subject of regulation.
Congress went so far as to amend most contracts between debtors and creditors
by suspending “Gold Clauses”18—and the Supreme Court upheld the 
intervention as constitutional.19 And during the 1970s, the Nixon and Ford 
administrations (with grudging support from their economic advisers) attempted
to mitigate the Great Inflation through the formation of Wage and Price Stability 
Boards—regulatory bodies with legal power.20 Although Nixon’s price controls,
implemented through the Wage and Price Stability Boards, may have failed, they 
show macroeconomics deeply enmeshed with law.
Even if macroeconomics and law are mutually interdependent, it could be
argued that macroeconomic reasoning is simply ill-suited to law relative to 
microeconomic reasoning. Many areas of law, such as common law, for example, 
proceed case-by-case. In these areas, law addresses incentive problems between
the parties to the case—the domain of microeconomics. Case-by-case reasoning,
by contrast, cannot easily solve systematic social ills like widespread
unemployment. If law and economics only applied to case-by-case reasoning,
then this hypothesis for the dominance of law and microeconomics would look
compelling. Using case-by-case adjudication to remedy recessions would be a 
heroic task—far better to rely on more systematic responses to macroeconomic 
problems offered by expert agencies such as central banks.
Law and economics, however, does not limit itself to case-by-case reasoning. 
Microeconomic reasoning is regularly applied to the systematic regulatory and
statutory solutions offered to complex multi-polar questions. Tax law, for 
example, helps determine the fiscal stance of the entire economy. Tax law is 
regularly used as a tool of macroeconomic policy—it is rare for a recession to
occur without a reduction in tax rates and change in tax rules. And yet tax law 
casebooks focus exclusively on microeconomic efficiency concerns in describing
the economics of tax, ignoring macroeconomics.21 
Tax law is no outlier. There are other regulatory regimes designed to solve 
systematic social problems that are almost exclusively examined from a 
microeconomic perspective within law and economics.  These regimes include 
antitrust law, the law of utility regulation, financial regulation (though this is 
17. See generally Steven A. Ramirez, The Emergence of Law and Macroeconomics: From Stability 
to Growth to Human Development, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. no. 1, 2020, at 219. 
18. Gold clauses in business contracts allowed a creditor to demand payment in gold rather than
currency. For a description of the controversy surrounding the suspension of these gold clauses by law,
see EDWARDS, supra note 2. 
19. See generally Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 
U.S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); United States v. Bankers Tr. Co., 294 U.S.
240 (1935). 
20. See generally Healy, supra note 3. 
21. See Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance of Macroeconomics for
Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 45, 58 (2012) (arguing for an increased emphasis on 
macroeconomics in teaching and research on tax law and policy). 
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rapidly changing), regulation of consumer finance and bankruptcy law,
environmental law, securities regulation, and land use regulation, among many
others. Decisions in these areas have important macroeconomic effects because 
of their systemic perspective. Yet these effects have been overlooked until very
recently. 
Some, including Kelman, argue that “macroeconomics may be less accessible
and illustrable by the use of ‘commonsensical analogies’ than microeconomics.”22 
Subtle macroeconomic argumentation requires an understanding of the 
interaction between the money market, markets for goods and services, and 
markets for saving and borrowing. As a result, sophisticated law and 
macroeconomics is undeniably difficult. 
But this sets the bar for law-and-macroeconomic arguments too high—and
well above the standard we set for law-and-microeconomic arguments. For law 
and microeconomics, we expect arguments that explain why certain laws and 
regulations are more or less likely to distort behavior and lead to efficient 
outcomes relative to other laws. The fact that distortions can only be defined
relative to a Pareto optimum that is ill-defined and essentially unreachable does 
not prevent engagement with these more tractable microeconomic 
considerations. Similarly, short-run law and macroeconomics, at its core, 
concerns itself with aggregate demand. And long-run law and macroeconomics, 
at its core, concerns aggregate supply—the economy’s total capacity to produce. 
A successful short-run law-and-macroeconomic argument needs to explain why 
a certain law or regulation is likely to encourage more spending in recessions and
less spending in booms than alternative policies. A successful long-run law-and-
macroeconomic argument should similarly explain why a certain law or 
regulation is more likely to raise the economy’s aggregate supply capacity than
the alternatives. While more detail than this is certainly welcome, law and 
macroeconomics should not be held to a higher standard than law and 
microeconomics.
Indeed, law and economics has not demanded more than this level of 
explanation from “Law and Finance,” which explains how law determines the 
size and structure of a country’s financial sector and output capacity— 
traditionally macroeconomic outcomes. The mechanism linking law to the size of 
the financial sector in the Law and Finance literature is ambiguous, to say the 
least. Nevertheless, this primarily empirical literature has flourished in spite of its 
ambiguous theoretical grounding.23 
In total, a lack of affinity between macroeconomics and law is not a
compelling explanation for the underdevelopment of law and macroeconomics.
The Great Moderation, by contrast, offers a better explanation. 
22. Kelman, supra note 1, at 1217 (error in original). 
23. See Steven Kaplan & Luigi Zingales, How “Law and Finance” Transformed Scholarship, 
Debate, CHICAGO BOOTH REVIEW (Mar. 5, 2014), https://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/spring-
2014/how-law-and-finance-transformed-scholarship-debate [https://perma.cc/2EBU-ZY4E] (describing
the influence of research taking a law and finance perspective). 
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IV 
THE GREAT MODERATION AND THE UNDERDEVELOPMENT OF LAW AND 
MACROECONOMICS
Law responds to pressing social problems. In the Great Depression, when
insufficient aggregate demand was perhaps the dominant policy problem, law 
responded. And when inflation reared its head in the 1970s, law responded again. 
Price controls, implemented by the Wage and Price Stability Board, attempted 
to mitigate high inflation, again putting law at the heart of macroeconomic policy. 
Then came the Great Moderation.
A. The Great Moderation and the Law 
No one described the legal trends of the Great Depression era as “law and 
macroeconomics”—perhaps because law and economics had yet to be seriously
developed.24 Yet as law and economics grew and thrived in the 1980s and 1990s, 
the salience of macroeconomic policy problems in the United States and Europe
decreased—a development known as the Great Moderation. With
macroeconomic policy problems fading into the background, there were 
relatively few laws and regulations passed with macroeconomic policy goals for 
law-and-economics scholars to analyze, and even less need to encourage the 
development of novel legal instruments to solve non-existent macroeconomic 
policy problems.
The term “Great Moderation” describes the “striking decline in the volatility 
of aggregate economic activity” experienced by most advanced economies 
between the early 1980s and the Great Recession of 2008 and beyond.25 In the 
United States, for example, the standard deviation of annual output growth (one 
measure of economic volatility), declined from 17.8% from 1954–1983 to only
7.7% from 1984–2005.26 Annual inflation rates also became lower and more
stable during the later period.27 
24. Even though no one described the Great Depression era macroeconomic policy as law and
macroeconomics, some appreciated the desirability of such a field. In the late 1950s, Guido Calabresi 
taught his first law and economics course at Yale Law School. Interview with Guido Calabresi, Professor 
Emeritus, Yale Law School, in New Haven, Conn. (Sept. 4, 2019). The course explored law from a
microeconomic perspective. Id. Yale Law School’s dean during this period, Eugene Rostow, was puzzled
by Calabresi’s microeconomic emphasis on microeconomics. Id. Finding Calabresi’s area of economic
emphasis puzzling, Rostow asked Calabresi to consider a class on law’s role in the prevention of
recessions and depressions—law and macroeconomics: Rostow considered depression prevention the 
primary task of economics. Id. Calabresi declined the request. Id. Rostow then asked Robert Bork to 
consider teaching law and macroeconomics. Id. Bork declined as well. Id. 
25. Steven J. Davis & James A. Kahn, Interpreting the Great Moderation: Changes in the Volatility
of Economic Activity at the Macro and Micro Levels, 22 J. ECON. PERSP., no. 4, Fall 2008, at 155, 155. 
26. Id. at 161. 
27. See id. at 163. 
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The causes of the Great Moderation are the subject of considerable debate. 
Some attribute the trend to good luck,28 others to economic shifts towards more
stable sectors (such as the growing role of services versus manufacturing),29 and 
still others attribute the trend to improvements in monetary policy.30 Whatever 
the cause, stable output and inflation diminished the motivation for legal and
regulatory fixes to macroeconomic problems. If the “central problem of 
depression prevention ha[d] been solved, for all practical purposes,”31 then why 
complicate law by attempting to solve a non-problem? In such an environment,
there was little practical push for the development of law and macroeconomics. 
Law-and-macroeconomic policy interventions on the scale of New Deal agencies 
or wage and price controls were nowhere to be found during the Great 
Moderation.32 
The Great Moderation also limited the urgency of macroeconomic analysis 
of legal topics with clearly macroeconomic origins. Programs and agencies such
as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, and Federal Reserve have transparently macroeconomic 
motivations. But evaluating the efficacy and boundaries of the legal framework 
of these institutions assumes less urgency when they are operating within a steady
state. As a result, the fields of law most connected to macroeconomics often 
became backwaters of law-and-economic analysis before the Great Recession. 
Indeed, financial regulations with macroeconomic motivations, such as the Glass-
Stegall Act’s limitation of financial institutions, drew “heavy criticism as a
Depression-era relic.”33 
The Great Moderation’s powerful impacts on intellectual trends in 
macroeconomics more broadly are exemplified by the steadily decreasing role 
attributed to fiscal policy within macroeconomics. Fiscal policy stabilization— 
lowering taxes and increasing spending during recessions and eliminating deficits 
during booms—was long a standard part of the post-World War II macro policy
toolkit. By the end of the Great Moderation in the mid-2000s, however, 
conventional macroeconomic wisdom dictated that “discretionary fiscal policy 
[was] dominated by monetary policy as a stabilization tool because of lags in the 
28. See, e.g., James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?, 17 
NBER MACROECONOMICS ANN. 159, 162 (2003). 
29. See Davis & Kahn, supra note 25, at 160. 
30. Richard Clarida, Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic 
Stability: Evidence and Some Theory, 115 Q.J. ECON. 147, 148 (2000). 
31. Lucas, supra note 5, at 1. 
32. This is not entirely true. In the wake of the Asian Crisis of 1997, some Asian nations adopted 
laws and regulations, such as capital controls, with macroeconomic motivations but little microeconomic
justification. See, e.g., Ethan Kaplan & Dani Rodrik, Did the Malaysian Capital Controls Work?, in
PREVENTING CURRENCY CRISES IN EMERGING MARKETS 393, 422–23 (Sebastian Edwards & Jeffrey
A. Frankel eds., 2002). 
33. Dan More, The Virtues of Glass-Steagall: An Argument against Legislative Appeal, 1991 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 433, 433 (1991). 
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application, impact, and removal of discretionary fiscal stimulus.”34 If the
intellectual case for an orthodox Keynesian tool like fiscal policy lost its mojo
during the Great Moderation, then we should not be surprised that academics 
did not consider a less conventional alternative—law and regulation—during the 
same period. Nor should we be surprised that legal analysis of the institutions of 
fiscal policy, tax, government benefits, and government procurement law— 
among others—emphasized microeconomic questions rather than
macroeconomics.
B. The Great Recession and Financial Regulation
The Financial Crisis of 2008 represented the “worst financial crisis in global 
history”35 and led directly to the Great Recession—the worst global recession
since the Great Depression.36 The macroeconomic turmoil brought an emphatic 
end to the Great Moderation. If the Great Moderation hindered the development 
of law and macroeconomics, then we would expect the Financial Crisis of 2008 
and the Great Recession that followed to stimulate the field because it deals with 
aggregate demand issues This is indeed what we have found—but only in limited 
fields. 
Many legal and regulatory changes followed the Financial Crisis of 2008.37 A 
combination of extraordinary Federal Reserve actions such as emergency lending 
and stress tests, combined with Congress’s passage of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008 and the establishment of the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program, restored calm to the financial sector.38 In 2010, Congress passed the 
Dodd Frank Act, “the greatest legislative change to U.S. financial regulation 
since the explosion of financial legislation in the 1930s.”39 Examining these legal
and regulatory developments without considering macroeconomics would not 
pass the smell test. Law and economics has risen to the occasion. Economic 
analysis of financial regulation and the housing market now regularly considers 
34. Jason Furman, The New View of Fiscal Policy and Its Application, VOX EU (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://voxeu.org/article/new-view-fiscal-policy-and-its-application [https://perma.cc/Q2X2-7HX6]. 
35. Tim Worstall, Opinion, Ben Bernanke: The 2008 Financial Crisis Was Worse than the Great 
Depression, FORBES (Aug. 27, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2014/08/27/ben-bernan/ 
ke-the-2008-financial-crisis-was-worse-than-the-great-depression [https://perma.cc/M2GR-89NX]. 
36. See, e.g., Josh Bivens, Worst Economic Crisis Since the Great Depression? By a Long Shot, 
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.epi.org/publication/snapshot_20100127 [https://perma.cc/
86FV-4Y5H]. 
37. This Article focuses on the American policy response to the Financial Crisis of 2008 and the
Great Recession that followed. The European policy response to the Financial Crisis of 2008 was
similarly robust, with national governments stepping in to rescue many failing financial institutions and
the ECB playing an extraordinary role. For a review, see generally EUROPEAN COMM’N DIRECTORATE-
GENERAL FOR ECON. & FIN. AFFAIRS, ECONOMIC CRISIS IN EUROPE: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
RESPONSES (July 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication15887_en./ 
pdf [https://perma.cc/2SQF-D5XE]. 
38. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 5201–61 (2012).  For the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program, see 52 U.S.C. §§ 5211–41. 
39. Randall Guynn, United States, in INT’L BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, A
SURVEY OF CURRENT REGULATORY TRENDS 25, 39 (2010). 
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“systemic risk,” a concept rarely explored in the pre-2008 literature. Many of the
contributors to this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems are, quite 
appropriately, specialists in these areas. 
Even though the Great Recession was severe, its magnitude was limited by
several decisive policy responses. In addition to the heroic efforts to rescue the 
financial sector just described, the U.S. (and international) economy was 
supported by unprecedentedly loose monetary policy and, in the short-run, 
significant fiscal stimulus. 
C. The Great Recession and Monetary Policy 
In ordinary economic times, central banks stimulate the economy by lowering
interest rates to encourage investment and consumption. At the outset of the 
Great Recession, central banks lowered interest rates significantly to stimulate 
their moribund economies. However, when nominal interest rates fall to zero, as 
they quickly did during the Great Recession, conventional monetary policy loses 
traction. To cope with this “zero lower bound” on interest rates, central banks 
adopt unconventional monetary policy measures, including quantitative easing.
In quantitative easing, central banks buy longer term assets that they normally
shun, seeking to affect rates on these assets, which remain above zero. Because 
markets for these assets are much larger than the market for short-term bonds 
usually targeted by central banks, quantitative easing necessitates a much greater 
role for the central bank in the economy. Between 2008 and 2017, for example, 
the five largest central banks increased their balance sheets four-fold—effectively
printing roughly fifteen trillion dollars in money and reserves over this period.40 
These extraordinary actions almost certainly mitigated the Great Recession.41 
Whatever its effects, quantitative easing does not represent central banking
as usual. Quantitative easing brings (unrealized) risks of inflation and may create 
asset bubbles.42 It expands the role of central banks in the economy and often 
stands in tension with legal restrictions on central banks, such as the Treaty of
Lisbon’s limitation on ECB monetary financing.43 As of yet, no central bank has 
successfully unwound quantitative easing. 
40. Tyler Durden, A Problem Emerges: Central Banks Injected a Record $1 Trillion in 2017 . . . It’s 
Not Enough, SNBCHF.COM (May 11, 2017), https://snbchf.com/2017/05/durden-emerges-central-banks-
trillion-2017 [https://perma.cc/7X5H-QZXU]. 
41. See, e.g., Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Effects of Quantitative 
Easing on Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 17555, 2011), reprinted in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2011, at 215. 
42. For an expression of inflation concerns, see, for example, Cliff Asness et al., An Open Letter to
Ben Bernanke, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2010), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/ 2010/11/15/open-letter-to-
ben-bernanke [https://perma.cc/J2VZ-34JA]. For concerns about massive central bank bond purchases
causing asset bubbles, see Jean-Michel Paul, Opinion, Why We Have to Talk About a Bubble, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-01-11/why-we-have-to-
talk-about-a-bubble [https://perma.cc/2NZC-ASHU].
43. Case C-62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutscher Bundestag, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=/ 
62014CJ0062 [https://perma.cc/Z2C6-RNPR] (June 16, 2015). 
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Consequently, legal limitations on central banks constitute an increasingly 
important subject for law and macroeconomics. The field has partially taken up 
the challenge.44 But the field of administrative law has curiously ignored central 
banks in spite of their importance. The problem for administrative law scholars 
may be that the study of central banks plainly requires macroeconomic 
sophistication, yet very few administrative law scholars have the macroeconomic 
background necessary to evaluate specific monetary policy or financial 
regulatory decisions on their own terms.45 Over time, however, the study of 
central banks as legal actors is likely to be a growing part of law and 
macroeconomics.
D. Fiscal Policy and Law and Macroeconomics 
The Great Recession overturned the macroeconomic consensus against fiscal 
stimulus that formed during the Great Moderation.46 During 2009, the G20
engaged in coordinated economic stimulus, which had substantial mitigating 
effects on the Great Recession.47 After the Great Recession, the new 
conventional wisdom, expressed by the Chair of the Council of Economic 
Advisers in 2016, held that “(1) [f]iscal policy is often beneficial for effective 
countercyclical policy as a complement to monetary policy. (2) Discretionary 
fiscal stimulus can be very effective and in some circumstances can even
[increase] private investment.”48 
In this environment, law-and-economic analysis of fields touching on fiscal 
policy—which includes tax law, the law of government benefits, government 
procurement law, and government insurance and lending programs such as the 
FHA’s mortgage insurance program—needs to consider the macroeconomic 
effects of laws. With limited exceptions,49 however, the study of these areas does 
44. See, for example, the work of Peter Conti-Brown, Robert Hockett, Kathryn Judge, Katharina
Pistor, Morgan Ricks, and Annelise Riles on this subject. 
45. In a recent working paper, my co-authors and I explore an alternative hypothesis. We argue that 
the judiciary rarely reviews Fed monetary policy because plaintiffs lack standing. In turn, the absence of 
case law makes Fed monetary policy relatively invisible to administrative law scholars. See generally Peter
Conti-Brown, Yair Listokin & Nicholas Parrillo, The Administrative Law of Central Banking (Yale Law 
Sch. Working Paper, Dec. 2019) (on file with author). 
46. For a review of the effects of fiscal stimulus on output during the Great Recession, see generally
Olivier J. Blanchard & Daniel Leigh, Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 
117 (2013). 
47. For a description of stimulus efforts of G20 countries in late 2008 to early 2009, see Eswar Prasad
& Isaac Sorkin, Understanding the G-20 Economic Stimulus Plans, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 15, 2009), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/understanding-the-g-20-economic-stimulus-plans/ [https://perma./ 
cc/99BC-BST4]. 
48.  Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisors, Expanded Version of Remarks Prepared 
for the Global Implications of Europe’s Redesign Conference: The New View of Fiscal Policy and Its 
Application (Oct. 5, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/2016/
1005_furman_suerf_fiscal_policy_cea.pdf [https://perma.cc/728P-AQN7]. 
49. See, e.g., Andrew Hayashi & Daniel P. Murphy, Savings Policy and the Paradox of Thrift, 34
YALE J. ON REG. 743 (2017); Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance of 
Macroeconomics for Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 45 (2012). 
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not do so, focusing on microeconomic aspects of the law almost exclusively. The 
near-complete absence of macroeconomic analysis in these fields, more than ten
years after the advent of the Great Recession, implies that developments in 
macroeconomic history alone do not fully account for the relative absence of law
and macroeconomics within law and economics.
E. Law and Macroeconomics Outside of Regulating the Money Supply and 
Conducting Fiscal Policy 
Monetary and fiscal policy, examined in the last two subparts, are the most 
conventional tools in the macroeconomic policy toolkit. Laws and regulations in
other areas offer additional tools to combat recessions, despite being 
underutilized. For example, as I describe elsewhere,50 regulated utility prices have 
similar effects to taxes. If utility prices were held down in recessions and allowed 
to rise more in booms, then overall spending would likely increase when 
unemployment is high—exactly what Keynesian policy prescribes. Many other 
areas of law, such as bankruptcy, the law of remedies, land use law, 
environmental law, and labor and employment law, show similar promise as tools 
of Keynesian aggregate demand management.
Law and macroeconomic analysis of these fields is in its infancy—even after 
the Great Recession. Although the academic study of law and macroeconomics 
outside of financial regulation and fiscal policy is underdeveloped, many different 
jurisdictions have implemented such policies. In China, for example, business-
cycle-sensitive regulation is a core part of macroeconomic policy.51 And, as 
described above,52 regulation and debt forgiveness formed an essential part of the 
U.S. government response to the Great Depression and the Great Inflation. To 
improve the effectiveness of these interventions, law and economics scholars will 
need to address them for what they are—macroeconomic interventions—rather 
than simply pointing out their microeconomic weaknesses. 
But the frequency of these policy interventions, and thus the urgency of law 
and macroeconomic analysis, will likely depend on future macroeconomic events.
V 
THE ROLE OF CHICAGO AND IDEOLOGY
Although the Great Moderation explains the lack of interest in law and 
macroeconomics in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, law and economics first 
50. See LISTOKIN, supra note 10. 
51. See Dena Sadeghian, Graham White & Patrick D’Arcy, Macroeconomic Management in China, 
in, RESERVE BANK AUSTL., BULLETIN: JUNE QUARTER 2013, at 11, 12–13 (Sept. 19, 2013), 
https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2013/jun/pdf/bu-0613.pdf [https://perma.cc/UZ4K-GWW4] 
(“The operation of macroeconomic policy in China differs from that typically used in developed 
economies, reflecting China’s particular institutional and economic environment. Macroeconomic policy
is implemented in a coordinated manner with authorities using a range of monetary, fiscal and regulatory 
policy instruments to achieve economic objectives.”). 
52. See supra Part I.A. 
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developed in the 1960s and 1970s. In this early period, the memory of the Great
Depression and the prominent role of Keynesian macroeconomics remained 
fresh.53 And in the 1970s, of course, the Great Inflation kept macroeconomics in 
the spotlight. In examining law and economics in the 1960s and 1970s, we cannot 
ascribe the lack of development of law and macroeconomics to stable 
macroeconomic conditions. 
What, then, explains why law and microeconomics, and not law and 
macroeconomics, took off? The University of Chicago was the place more 
responsible for the growth of law and economics than any other. The University 
of Chicago Law School was the home of many of the field’s founders, including 
Ronald Coase, Richard Posner, and Aaron Director. In addition to being 
intellectual pioneers, Coase, Posner, and Director were also intellectual 
entrepreneurs who helped popularize law and economics analysis. Director
founded and Coase co-edited the first journal in the field: the Journal of Law and 
Economics.54 Posner then founded and edited the field’s second forum, the 
Journal of Legal Studies. 
Coase, Posner, and Director examined law from a microeconomic 
perspective. Their proclivities were likely enhanced by the sustained interest in
law demonstrated by two prominent Chicago micro-economists and Nobel Prize
winners, Gary Becker and George Stigler. Indeed, Stigler was one of the 
colleagues who drew Posner to Chicago from Stanford.55 Future Nobel Prize
winners with considerable credibility within economics, Stigler’s and Becker’s
support lent instant credibility to the nascent field.
If any would-be Posners at Chicago had developed an interest in the
macroeconomics, by contrast, then their economics department colleagues likely 
would have discouraged rather than encouraged them. The dominant 
macroeconomist in the Chicago economics department at the time was Milton 
Friedman—also a future Nobel Prize winner. Friedman espoused “monetarism”:
the view “that monetary policy is more potent and useful than fiscal policy for 
stabilizing the economy.”56 If fiscal policy was unnecessary for macroeconomics,
then law and regulation were beyond the pale. Indeed, monetarists harshly 
criticized the most important experiment in 1970s law and macroeconomics— 
Nixon’s wage and price controls—“because these would create market 
distortions.”57 Instead, monetarists like Friedman argued for limitations to the
money supply as the best cure for the Great Inflation.58 To monetarists, using law 
for macroeconomic ends was a harmful sideshow, doomed to distort markets 
53. See supra note 24. 
54. Aaron Director, Founder of the Field of Law and Economics, THE UNIV. OF CHI. NEWS OFFICE
(Sep. 13, 2004), http://www-news.uchicago.edu/releases/04/040913.director.shtml [https://perma.cc
/Z6YH-KMEY]. 
55. WILLIAM DOMNARSKI, RICHARD POSNER 57–58 (2016). 
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without improving outcomes.59 Chicago, the hotbed of early law and economics,
was thus far more conducive to the development of law and microeconomics than 
law and macroeconomics from an intellectual perspective.
Macroeconomic history also played a role. The primary macroeconomic 
problem of the 1970s—inflation—was ill-suited to legal and regulatory solutions.
As the failure of price controls demonstrated, the approaches of law and 
regulation do not offer a long-term solution to inflation. Law and
macroeconomics thus proved naturally unattractive to scholars writing in the 
1970s. Law and regulation, however, can stimulate economies and reduce 
unemployment when monetary policy proves unable to stimulate due to the zero 
lower bound or other constraints, as occurred during the Great Depression and
Great Recession.60 Today’s more Keynesian-friendly macroeconomic conditions 
are thus a much more plausible ally to the development of law and
macroeconomics than the macroeconomics facing the early law and economics 
scholars working at Chicago.
Ideology contributed to the spread of the law and microeconomics initially
developed at Chicago. Chicago law and economics, with its emphasis on the
elimination of market-impeding imperfections, proved attractive to conservative
philanthropic organizations such as the Olin Foundation.61 As one scholar of
philanthropy explained:
Staff members at the Olin Foundation noted that lawyers tend[ed] to play influential 
roles in various segments of society. The Foundation consequently provided substantial 
funding to shape the intellectual climate in the legal realm to embrace free market 
insights through the study of economic implications of law . . . . [L]aw and economics 
and economics was an accepted paradigm in legal scholarship in the 1970s, but its use
was limited. The Foundation perceived an opportunity to spread its adoption in legal
scholarship and among current and prospective legal practitioners.62 
The Olin Foundation contributed more than $50 million to support 
microeconomic analysis of the law.63 This support played a critical role in 
expanding law and economics’ influence. For example, the Olin Foundation and
the similarly-minded “Liberty Fund” funded free multiday law and economics 
education seminars that helped spread microeconomic reasoning throughout the
59. From the late 1970s onward, macroeconomics at the University of Chicago was dominated by
the “real business cycle” approach, often associated with Chicago macroeconomist Robert Lucas 
(another Nobel Prize winner). The real business cycle approach attributes the business cycle to
“technology shocks” that stimulate changes in labor supply and capital accumulation. In real business 
cycle theory, recessions are not inefficient. Therefore, there is no reason for policy to mitigate them. As 
a result, there is no place for macroeconomically motivated changes to law, which will cause
microeconomic harm for no macroeconomic benefit. For a review of real business cycle theory, see
generally N. Gregory Mankiw, Real Business Cycles: A New Keynesian Perspective, 3 J. ECON. PERSP.,
no. 3, Summer 1989, at 79. 
60. See Listokin, supra note 10, at chs. 9–11. 
61. See Steven Schindler, Revolutionizing Legal Discourse: Law and Economics, in  JOEL L.
FLEISHMAN ET AL., CASEBOOK FOR THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET 148, 150 (2007). 
62. Id. at 150. 
63. Id. at 149. 
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legal academy and judiciary.64  And it is almost impossible to imagine the Olin 
Foundation or the Liberty Fund providing similar support to law and economics 
had it been focused on macroeconomics, which emphasizes a fundamental 
market failure (widespread unemployment) at the heart of modern economies 
and so cannot avoid market regulation.65 
VI
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF LAW AND MACROECONOMICS
The remarkable success of law and microeconomics provides another 
obstacle to the development of law and macroeconomics. Law and
microeconomics enjoys the benefit of a large foundation of knowledge. Many 
legal scholars have invested the time to acquire basic microeconomic skills. They
understand the language of law and microeconomics. But this base of knowledge 
does not extend to macroeconomics, which asks different questions and requires
a different skill set. Law and macroeconomics will therefore require scholars to
develop new skills—always a hard task when the benefit is uncertain. 
I thus conclude with a prediction. Law and macroeconomics’ future depends 
on three things: The subfield will thrive (1) if macroeconomics remains an urgent 
part of the economic policy discourse, (2) if the field receives support and
recognition from macroeconomists seeking to understand the role of law in their 
fields, and (3) if macroeconomic education for lawyers (which should likely also
consider the role of inequality) receives the kind of sustained support that so 
benefited law and microeconomics.
64. Id.; see also Henry Manne, How Law and Economics Was Marketed in a Hostile World: A Very
Personal History, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS
309, 318–20 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005); Elliott Ash, Daniel L. Chen & Suresh 
Naidu, Ideas Have Consequences: The Impact of Law and Economics on American Justice (Mar. 20, 
2019) (unpublished) (describing the effects of these free seminars on judicial decision-making). 
65. For an in-depth discussion of the Olin Foundation’s role in funding the rise of law and 
economics, see STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 181–219 
(2008). 
